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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

The Plaintiff-Respondant should be estopped

from asserting title to certain property referred to herein
as the "Hunt Property".
2.

The Plaintiff-Respondant should be estopped

from asserting an objection to the sale by Defendant-Appellant
of the

property referred to herein as the "Hunt Property"

to the Cross Plaintiff-Appellant.
3.

The Court erred in sustaining objections to

evidence tending to show that Plaintiff-Respondant abandoned
the

subject property and his claim of any interest in it

and that he should be estopped from asserting such a claim.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1-

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to partition real property in
which the

title is held in joint tenancy and for dama8es

by a third party who purchased the property from one of the
joint tenants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case \vas tried to the Court.

From a judgment

for the Plaintiff, Cross Complainant and Defendant both
appeal.
ReLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, VERE BECKSTROI1, seeks reversal of the
judgoent and judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or
that failing,

a new trial.
STATE11ENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff,

~!ARION

BECKSTROM, arc brothers.

BECKSTROM, and Defendant, VERE

(Tr. PI+O, LL22-2 3)

In 19!+9, VERE and MARION, \vho hnd just come home
from the service, purchased 80 acres in the area ncar Beryl,
Utah (Tr. P40, LL21-23) often referred to by the parties as
the "Hunt Property" or as the pnJjK~rly "on the desert", \vhic'·
is the subject of this lawsuit.
VERE ;md his \vi fe, EL IZAEETil, pRid the dm,•n
of $2,000"00 out of their
LL6, 7 & 13

S3)'S

S3vings.

payr~er

(The transcript, P65,

$1,/00.00 but cn•mscl n:pn.•senls that that
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is an error in the transcript and the figure should be
$12,000o00o

See, for example, Deposition of Plaintiff,

MARION BECKSTROH, P3, Ll6) was borrowed from ELIZABETH
BECKSTROM's brother, RODNEY SNOW,
a mortgage,

(Tro P65, LLll-15) giving

to secure the loan, on 25 acres of property

owned by MARION together with some property adjacent to
it mvned by VERE in Pine Valley, Utaho

(Tro P65, LL19-20)

MARION moved onto the 80 acres on the desert and
attempted to farm it, while VERE operated the 25 acres of
property in Pine Valley owned by !1ARION, together with
property he owned himself in Pine Valley as well as some
property he leased from his sister, also in Pine Valley.
Thereafter, l1ARIO!l and VERE and VERE' s wife,
ELIZABETH purchased an additional 80 acres "on the desert"
referred to as the "LC?wis Property" \Jhich l1ARION also
occupied and attempted to operate together with the Hunt
Property.

(Tr. P31, LL27-29)
After attempting to operate the Hunt Property

for approximately 10 years, and the Lewis Property for a
portion

cf that time, l1ARION abandoned both properties

(Tro P31, L30; P32, LLl-2, 27-29)
H'\RION paid none of the taxes on the Hw1t Property
11hile

re

occupit:'d it and attcrnpte?d to farm it (TL P20,

fl.S-9; 1'29, LL16-l8).

They lvcre? all paid by 1/ERE BECKSTROMo

Ii,•i tlwr did HARTON make any paymen Ls on the note to RODNEY
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SNOW during those ten years.

(Tr. P26, LL23-30; P27, Ll)

It was not until MARION had abandoned both the
Lewis Property and the Hunt Property that he made any payment
whatever on the mortgage or on taxes.

After he had abandoned

the property, he made the final payment of approximately
$1,500,00 to RODNEY SNOH which \vas needed to release the
mortgage that was on his as well as VERE BECKSTROM's property
in Pine Valley.

(Tr. P27, LL2-15)

In approximately November, 1959, after

~~RION

had abandoned the Beryl property, VERE met MARION on the
street in St.

Gc>~>c-;;e

and asked him

j

f he would

pay the

taxes on the Hunt Property.

(Tr, 1'22, LL16-18; P29 LL 19-23)

MAIUON refused to do so nne!,

in fact,

did not pay any taxes

on the property llwreafter just as he had not prior thereto.
(Tr. P45, LL23-25; P64, LLl-8)
MARION ackno\vle<iged that he knew and unrlerstood
that if

~xes

were not paid,

the property

could be sold

for back taxes by the county nnd that it 1-10nld be lost by
him.

(Tr. P30,

LLl-13)

Afl:er HARTON abzmdoned the lhmt and Lewis Propertv,
the Lewis Property, according to ~~RION, was lost by foreclo•
(Tc P32, LL28-29) and accorcling to VFRE, 1r1s sold to avoid
[orecloc ure (Tr, P6l, LL'l-10).
VERE, after i',\RTotl alJ,mJc,Jwd the l11111t

Pn•p<'t-L)'

and after he rc>fused lo pay any t.Jxc's on it, moved (lnto the
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Hunt
he

froperty

and farmed it for approximately 2 years until

SJffered a severe stroke and \las unable to operate the

property himself any longer,

(Tr, P62, 1122-30; P63, LLl-6)

lfuile operating the property, VERE drilled a well
to replace one that had caved in while !1ARIO!l operated the
property,

That well cost approximately $2,300,00 which was

paid entirely by VERE.

(Tr. P68, LLl-8)

After VERE suffered a stroke and was physically
unable to operate the Hunt Property any longer, he caused
it to be leased for approximately six years.

(Tr. P41, 114-5)

In 1972, VERE BECKSTR0!1 entered into a sale agreement
with Cross Plaintiff-Appellant, NORMAND LAUB, to sell the
Hunt Property for $20,000.00.

(Tr. P42, 118-10 and Plaintiff's

Exhibit 14).
In 1974, Plaintiff, l1ARION BECKSTROM, filed the
instant case naming V£RE RECKSTROl1 and NORMAND D. LAUB as
Defc=ndants and NORMAlJD D. LAUE filed a Cross-Complaint against
VJmr: BECKSTR01'1 and his wife, ELIZABETH.
ARGU!1ENT
I,
The Plaintiff-Respondant should be estopped
[rom ;sserling title to certain property referred to herein
•1s f·he "Hunt Property".
i'J.,\RION ;cmd VERE BECKSTR0!1 1vere brothers,
l-11\P.Iotl

rt'

Hhen

turned from Lhe service in 19!+9, VERE, Hho \vas

J:nrric·d to ELfi:ABETH, made the dm-m payment of $2,000o00 on
:m 80 ;Jere

tract of ground on the desert near Beryl, Utah.

'l'hcy rai:;cd the baLmce of $12,000,00 to purchase the property
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by borrowing it from ELIZABETH 1 s brother, Dr. RODNEY SN0\1,
This was done, at least partially, if not

pri~arily,

to

provide a home (Tr. P72, LL12-24) and an occupation for

MARION, but also to earn a profit, according to the testimony
of VERE and ELIZABETH.

To secure the loan from SNOW, a

mortgage was placed upon 25 acres of property owned by
l1ARION, inherited from his parents, together with land
adjacent to it, owned by VERE,
While ELIZABETH taur;ht school, VERE operated the

Pine Valley property belonging both to himself and to MARIOII,
and MARION moved onto the 80 acres of desert land referred
to as the "Hunt P r<1pe rty".
Thereafter, an additional 80 acres, referred to as
the "Lewis PJ:operty" \vas purchased for ]'!ARION to operate
to(',ether

\vith the Hunt Property JT1:1king a total of 160 acres

on the desert.
l'!ARION, hmmver, spent much of his time, according
to his

~stimony,

working for the rai1road, sorting potatoes

and attf'nding "G.I. School" (Tr. P20, LL18-7.2) uhich had not~
to do with making productive the 160 acres he was supposed
to be L1rrning.
After ten years on the prope1:ty, durinr; which tine
he did not contribute illljlhing lo
and

ihc~

payr:~,cnts

on tlw

mortg.~

did not contribute nnylhing to the payn1ents on !H'-'Pcrl\'

taxes, t1ARION abandoned both the Hunt :md the Lch•is P ropL>rti
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During that time, VERE, who was operating the small
acreage at Pine Valley, part of which was owned by him and
part

~

MARION, while ELIZABETH, his wife, taught school,

paid all of the payments on the mortgage except the final
one of approximately $1,500.00 and paid all of the taxes on
the Hunt and Lewis Property.

MARION freely acknowledged that

VERE and ELIZABETH made those payments.

In 1959, when MARION left the property near Beryl,
he did so proclaiming in no uncertain terms that he wanted
nothing more to do >vi th farming the property and that it
1vas no good and that he wasn't interested in preserving it
by even paying the taxes on it,

(Tr. P22, LL27-29; P22,

LL26-28; P26, Ll9; P29, LLll-15; P48, LL7-9; P62, LL12-l3;
P67, LL22-25)
Hhile }!ARION was operating the property, the Hell
caved in and \Jas not repaired or rep laced by l1ARION, so that
after he abandoned the property, VERE, who then began to
operate the 1!1mt Pt-operty himself, was forced to drill a 'dell
on the

~operty

at a cost of $2,300.00 which he also paid

entirely himself.

(P68, LLl-6)

Ho,vever, of great si[,'11ificance at the time of
:L'Il<LUN's ab;:mdoning the Hunt Properly is his concurrent
,lb: ;ldom;, 0 nt of t-he Lcc1vis ProperLy and 1-ihat happ2ned to it.
He h,-ul h 0 en operating both 80 a_cre paccels jointly \vhen he
;:;ave up and P10vcr1 off.

T110U(ih the Court sustained some
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objections to questions concerning the Lewis Property and
thereby prevented a complete disclosure of the evidence whic'
would, in the Defendant-Appellant's opinion, have supported
the

~sition

that there was an estoppel in pais, i.e. that

MARION is estopped from asserting title to the property in
question, some limited evidence concerning it was admitted
and it is significant.
MARION testified that when he abandoned the two
properties, both Lc1vis and Hilll t, he had a buyer for them by
the name of JOE ROMERO, "before the Le1vis place went back".
(Tr. P23, LL3-6)

He stated that VERE refused to sell the

re:

properties and

,<JcJed that one 1'1R. LEWIS did foreclose on

the parcel 1vhich he had sold to !1ARION and VERE.

(Tr. P32,

1128-29)
V"~RE,

was

hmvever,

testified that the Lewis Property

indeed sold to avoid foreclosure to JOE ROI'\ERO at that

(Tr. PS2, 1124-30; P53, LLl-8)

t

l1ARION had '-lashed his hancls

of the lvhole affCJir, cxcept to suggest thilt JOE ROl'TI.:RO I·JaS
intcrcsterl in

put~clLJsing

the 1)roperLy.

VERE insisted JOE

ROHERO only had nn i11terest in pcn·chasing L11e Lewis Property,
not the Hunt Property.

(Tr. P53, LL3-8)

It wonld appc:1r logical, sitlL'c:' the Lr'His l'rl!pcrty
\,•as sold to RO!·mP.O accnnlinp; to Vt:RE,

that it

.:.lS

1une

<

to

avoid the threat of frHcc]nc;uJe by U:ULS .mel Lo nvoid the
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sometimes devastating effects on VERE and his wife as well
as 11ARION, of a foreclosure proceeding.
However, the Hunt Property posed an entirely
different situation to VERE and ELIZABETH.
To that time in 1959, they had paid all the payments
on the mortgage and on taxes themselves.

There remained

only $1,500.00 left in order to own it free and clear.

There

was not the pressing need to sell it to save it from foreclosure
that there was with the Lewis Property and they did not want
to sell it - still believing, in spite of MARION's poor track
record over the past 10 years, that the property had some
value.
Had MARION had the interest, at that time, in the
property and particularly in selling it, that he displayed
14 years later 1"hen this suit \Jas filed, he could have filed
a partition action then to force "an accounting" or to force
sale.
Obviously, however, he did not because he considered
the

1 and I,Jorthless and even more important had contributed

nothing to acquiring it or preserving it to that point.

He

does no1v aq~ue (?~~_facto that the proceeds from the Pine
Valley property, part of which belonged to him, went to the
paymr>nt of the

I/1Cnt

p,niie and tAxes on the Hunt Property.

ll<hiCVer, it is just as arguable that the funds used to pay
the taxes and mortgage are as much or more the result of the
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hard work and efforts of VERE as they were the fruits of that
bare land.
MARION did not produce anything to contribute to

the taxes and mortgage payments off of a total of about 4
times more land than that which VERE was operating.
l1ARION abandoned the property,

let the Lewis Properc

be either sold or foreclosed upon with no argument or interes
in its disposition.
l1ARION did pay the final payment of approximately

$1,500.00 on the mortgage, but in spite of his present
protestations to the contrary, it is apparent that he did so
primarily to re?move the C?ncuf'lbr;mce

n~;ainst

his Pine Valley

Property rather than to preserve the Hunt Property.
Furthennore, shortly after abnnclrmi ng the p:cope?rty,
VEl~

confronted l·!ARTON and,

nfter ten ye;ns of paying the

taxes on the Hunt Property himself

ilS

IJe>ll as the taxes on

tr

Pine Valley property, part of which \vas mmced by J.1/\RION,
asked l'!.ARION if he

\•!ilS

z:,oi ng to pay the t:1xe s 1-Jhich lit>re due

on the H1mt Property,
of fact,

did not!

unrlerstood Lhat if !<"xes \.'ere not p<lid,

the pl·opr'rLy could

;>nd 1-muld be taken by the Lndt18 :111Lhol'ity in lieu of taXI'S.
Nc>v'crthele~~s,

he ('ill1''r di.d nol_-

t',lr-r-',

1:hich

is

the cnntcill-it'·-

of the DcfcnrLmt-,\ppell;mt, or: he ,.,,,,]d not pay tl1e
In either event, lwc1 it not bec_•n

l:1X<'S,

for: VC:f<b:'s curr1ing to the
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rescue

~ain

and paying those taxes for the next 14 years,

the county would, no doubt, have taken the property and MARION
would have had nothing to be claiming now!
VERE, on the other hand, assumed the burden of paying
taxes

from 1959 to 1974, in addition to having paid them the

previous ten years, assumed the expense and obligation of·
drilling a well at a cost of $2,300.00 to himself, maintained
water

rights, leased the property vlhen he was himself incapacitated

physically and did all of that which was necessary to retain
and maintain the property under the honest impression that
~~RION

had abandoned any interest or claim in the property.
Again, it is extremely important to note, that had

VERE not done these things, there \vould have been no property
to

sell to the Cross-CofTlplainant, NORMAND LAUB and there

lWUld l1ave been no property for MARION to now claim is half
his!
Furthermore, VERE, after operating the property
for a couple of years and then becoming incapacitated physically
by a severe stroke, leased it for several years thereafter,
finally sold the property for the sum of $20,000.00, a figure
\·;hich Cross CompLJinant-Appellant's expert witness testified
was a fair and reasonable value for the property when it was
sold

in 1972.

('fro P96, LL23-26)

'l1w Defcndant-·AppelLmt,

from the time a lfotion

to Amend his Answer to allc~e an affirmative defense, to-wit,
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that the Plaintiff be estopped from claiming an interest
in the subject property, has maintained and attempted to she.
that an estoppel in pais existed in spite of the Court's
refusal to even consider that principal of law, as will be
more fully reviewed in paragraph III infra.
In 1880, the United States Supreme Court announce(
perhaps the leading case pertaining to Equitable Estoppel
or

Estoppel in Pais as it applies to a situation similar

the situation that exists in the instant case.
~~~~o~~.

in that case, Dickerson vs.

~

The facts

100 U.S. 578, 25 L.

Ed. 618, were that one MORTON purchased land by Warranty
Deed from JOHN VLTtlE and his v1ife, Si\IZAH, daughter of
MICAJAH CHANCEY, 11ho had cn-med it until his death.

]·lORTON,

after occupying the land for several years, learned of the
existence of a brother of SARAH KLINE and a son of MICAJAH
CHANCEY,

one EDl·JL:ND C!IANO:Y, and IHote to him asking if he

made any claim to the Lmd.
sister, SARAH, saying he

EDl-!lltW C][i\!JCEY 1-note back to h;

di~d

not 1:1ake a cl

:~im

and di savowin,;

any intention of ever making a claim to the land.
The.ceafter, hm-;cv0r, J·:JJl'diND CIIANCJcY did 1~."ke a cl
and con veycd by Q11i t-Cl aim need the p: npert y rn one Ill CKf:F~
1vho then filed a suit for ejC'ctnir>nt

:~g:dnst:

il1e !kft·:1d:mts,

COLGROVE, successor to ;;OKJ'ON.

The SuprerT:e Collrl of the l:ni
against the

Plaintiff, fi11ding ih:Jt.:

i

cd Stat:c·,; d,•,_·i,:L·d

]J,, \·::1s

l'stoppcd l)y his
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deeds and

~tions

from later asserting a title or claim

to the property he had once disavowed.
The Court reflected upon the effect upon MORTON
of CHANCEY's letter disclaiming an interest:
"He was lulled into security. He took no
measures to perfect title, nor to procure
any redress from the Klines."
The Court then proceeded to elaborate upon the
principal involved:
"The estoppel here relied upon is known
as an equitable estoppel or estoppel in
pais •••• The vital principal is, that he
who, by his language or conduct, leads
another to do \-Jhat he would not othen1ise
have done, shall not subject such person
to loss or injury by disappointing the
expectations upon Hhich he acted."
The Court adds:
"This remc:;dy is al\/ays so applied as to
promote the ends of justice. It is
.lv-11T;:!hJc_o_n_ly-for-p-rot:CC:tTon, and cannot
l1c= usPd as a \·/c,,pon of a~>saul t.
It accomplishes
i~hat \·,>hich on::;ht to be done beU·;ccn <nan and
11.·m, and it j s not pC'rmi tted to go b<2yond
lhis limit.
Jt: is akin t:o t:he principal
involved in the limitation of actions, and
,',J<'S i ls ',-;o,-k of justice ;1nd repose '·;hC're
ill<' sl :Jl<ll:C e:"''not: be in\·Oked." (E,nphasis
.\dded)
This q11olc,

it,

:~nd

rc'f<·,·ring to

lht·n hnving rc=fu::L·u Co pay

Lhe

:my

l'nds of justice as it

tCJxes thereafter to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

preserve, all because he did not consider the property to be
of any value at that time, should not, at this late date, be
able to come in 14 years later, when historical circumstances
have created value that did not appear to be there previously
i.e.

the increased scarcity of water and consequent increase

in value of water, and exploit and take advantage of VERE's
foresight and VERE' s efforts and expenses in preserving and
maintaining the property.
Of course, one might argue that in the Dickerson
case

there was a letter from CHANCEY disav01ving any claim to

the property 'vhich constitutes a writing and that
,-.~ri

ting is not present in the instant case.

the Dickerson case, hmvever, cited a case

SJch a

The Court, in

[:0-t:._o~

vs. fn)(_on,

38 Mich 159 wherein the Court said:
"The CoPlplainant may have estopped himself
without any positive agre~mcnt if he
intcmtionally led Defendants to do or
abstain Irmn doing anything involving
labor or expenditure to a11y considerable
amount by giving Llll'I~ to ,_,,1,~cersLllld tl1at they
should be relieved [ruP1 t_hc bunlc'n of the
mol-tga,gcs ""

action, may causQ a s~c-und lo t-ely upun that action e1nd

appeared to he a distinct Jis.I\'<

.JS"

1l uf :ii1Y i,ltcrc·st ~n ihe
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Hunt Property by his brother, MARION.

l1ARION had left the

property, stated he wanted nothing to do with it, had similarly
abandoned companion property and allowed it to either be sold
to prevent foreclosure or it had been foreclosed and had refused
to pay taxes.

VERE then went to much labor and expense and

assumed the responsibilities of paying taxes and the other
concurrent responsibilities of ownership of land in order to
preserve that property believing l1ARIO!I would never express
an interest in it thereafter.
The Dickerson case Supra, also cited Harkness vs.
Toulmin, 25 Mich 80 and Truesdail vs.

\~ard,

24 Mich 117 and

made this further comment:
"There is no rule more necessary to enforce
good faith than that which compels a person
to abstain from asserting claims which he
has induced others to ~_l.l2_S~ he. 11ould not
rely on.
The rule does not rest on the
assuJc,ption that he has obtained any personal
gain or advantage, but on the fact that he
has induced others to act in such a manner
that they will be seriously prejudiced if
he is allo,·;ed to fail in carrying out \·!hat
he has Pncouraged t:hem to expect."
In the p1-c0cnt case, VERE BECKSTROM relied upon the
acts dnd sta! cmcnts of his brother, 11ARION, and supiJosed that
he ,,udc> ro clnim and had no interest in the Hunt Property.
feelyi ng upon that, VERE operated the property himself for 2
year.s, including ;1ssuming all the costs and expenses of
:'aintaining and i1·1proving it,

leased it for several years

after he was physically incapacitated from operating it
hitnself and ultimately sold the property for $20,000.00.
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Now, however, MARION makes a claim to that property,
and as a result of the finding of the Court below that MARio:;
is entitled to a one-half interest in that property, VERE is
faced with a potential claim of up to $35,000.00 by the Cross
Co~plainant-Appellant

for damages, based upon the current

value of the property of $75,000.00, since, under the ruli~
of the lm-Jer court, VERE only had a one-half interest in the
property to convey.
faith,

This hardly seems a just reward for his

dili8ence and sacrifice in attempting to preserve the
~aintaining

property by paying taxes upon it and

and

impro~

the property over the many yl'ars t l1at he did so, all at a
t·h1e \vhcn lll\RlON 1• .d no faith in i
a~si.st

\villingness to

('(l[

1,,>11t

t11;tl Just i

and had dL;avowed :my

1:

in the p:l)'ill·nt of the taxes or :lny oLh

l_·e

'\·.':1:-:;
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is c:<Jctly

' i I"!

l1 I

ill\:(',,

)( \ ~ ( d t l.) d i
uf ,,ly l1 1-c ,_ll{'J·n

.:;_,:lin,

lt_'t'<-;

1

i

I

I

o

1t

ill(~

-he

11

illt'

t\_·1_-

11,,j;l'lj)1-,

1

·:ir

11

.liic•n

that 11:-1s

cxi,;tcd in Lhe inst.mt <'.J:;c.
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o

fact,

relied upon the representation of MARION and has

certainly taken steps that he would not have taken had he
believed that his brother, t1ARION, claimed an interest in
the property.
VERE

It would, no doubt, have been very easy for

to have obtained the signature of MARION on the Contract

of S:>le for $20,000.00 in 1972, which '"as then the admitted
value of the property, if, in fact, MARION had, as he now
insists, asked VERE to sell the property on a previous
occassion once, only 2 years earlier.

VERE did not seek

HARION' s signature because he did not believe that MARION
claimed any interest in the property, or that having failed
to contribute to its maintenance, was not entitled to any
interest, even if he did claim it.
'tne ])i_cv':.erson case

~ra

further commented in

ce f<'rence to Another case, ~v-~ns vs. !:)_f0'der, 64 t1o. 516:
"But the SuprePlC~ Court of the state held
t·h3t 1-Jhc,-e they stcmd silently by for years
\-lhi_l c the occup:mt 11as making valu:1ble and
l:1st ing jp·,provc:,nent·s on the property nnd
redrc-ming it from the lien of the m1ccstor's
,],-~)lS, his heirs v.-o11ld he c•:;topped frnm
aftcn-,'anls asserting tl1eir claim."
Jn llulst<'en vs. 'I11_t2lllE_S()_~, 169 N.H. 2d 554, the Court
,.q,,wiai,,s the ru]c involved herein as follows:
"One 1-;ho, by his u_-nunciaLinn or disclaimer
f 1 it l0 co p r-opcrty has i nduccd another
1 o 1wli L'VC :1nd :1ct thereon to his prejudice
is <-:;iuppc•d to :JC:SL·rt such title.
L_uc_:~ vs.
ll<l rt. 5 r (Jh';} !+ l 5, 4 J 9; l~Qo_l-:~1)_ vs. ~1c_I2_owe_!_l,
Jl!l-ful:a :286, 2'10, 119 N.IJ. 702, 703, 3 l
LI\1 \NS, 176 (Ti t:l c Qui ctcd in Plaintiff based
0
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on estoppel against Defendant); Koep vs,
146 Iowa 179, 182, 123 N.W. 174,
; Thorn vs. Thorn, 208 Minn. 461, 294
N.H. "Zi-bl," 464 (facts similar to case et
bar)"

~lSp,

The Holsteen case Supra quotes from 28 Am Jur 2d,
Estoppel and Waiver, Section 81, Page 723 as follows:
"Although the courts are inclined to be
SOillC'\vhat more reluctant to give effect to
estoppels when they effect the title to
real estate and in other instances, the
rule is generally well settled in the
modern law that the title to land or real
property may pass by an equitable estoppel,
which is effectual to take the title to
land from one person and invest it in
another 1vhere j~sUce rC'~i__Ees that such
<-l~tj_2~ j:J_e__J'l_oi1~·
(Emphasls Adaeo)
Defend:mt-Appl'lLmt has been unable to find where
the Supreme Court of Utah has dealt with this prl'cise
previously, however, Thorn vs.

/+61, cited in the

1-!oJ:str_~:Q.

:r}-l_Cl_~,

c:1se

iss~

208 Minn. /+61, 294 N.H.

Sup~~

pertained to a factual

situation, that in C!ll cssc:nt:ials, is SLmilar to the insL1nt
case.

/\ll.THUR

'tdOH,

the Plaintiff,

:md

lil~;\iiK

't'liOH subjcc·t

to a

ttlortt>'i~C in the ,i!JOlmt of $7,001L00 to his, \JILtL\11 C,

bux

l:o \·.hich

i\l~TIJIIR

THtll'1,

tlH'

l'l:tintiff, did

lllil::'

nut h.t'JC ,c·c,,·

\Jarr;mty Deed t:o CLJFFORD Tllllti, his ,oun, t:hc fl,•ft·nd.mt L11 '

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

The Deed to Arthur and to FRANK was recorded at
the same time as the Deed from FRANK to CLIFFORD, but the
name, "ARTHUR" had been, it was later determined, erased

rr

from

by that time, by an unknown party, so that on the

record, ARTHUR,
to

the Plaintiff, appeared to have no claim

the land.
ARTHUR and FRANK had earlier delivered a mortgage

to their mother on the property for $7,000.00 to replace
the ori8inal one from HILLIAM. CLIFFORD leased the farm
from ARTHUR and FRANK :md coJTlmenced to operate it for 4 years
until he reC'cived a Deed to the property from his father,
FI\ANK.

A title company noted, at that tiJTle, hmvever, that
ARTHUR was listed as a JT!Ortgager and wanted a Quit-Claim
l)ced from him, ,.Jhich he then refused to give.

It was also

at ll1at tiPle thAt it w:1s discovered that the Deed had been
n'cocclcd 1-1ith his n:;me erased, but still delectable on it.
\.Then the n10r 1 ~;n2_;e for $7,000.00 from ARTHUR ::md
;. :' :'<. '1:1d C<lr·lier bccOtl1e d11r;, Plaintiff, AR1llUR THOM,
il.c

•l)!'l:>'!~"e's

·~nl'"~:~c

told

srm,. oo"he could not do a thing CJbout the

:md lw had :1ll he could h:mdle at home."
Th:1t 1 :m~~~wge '"as very sintilar in context to the

',i :; .1 1:111
·':Lr·d i f

,1 ,

y,

.~ 1 ~ n he

p:tid

:1ny

"'1i

i.dXCS

rl,

"·.:ell, he (VEI<I~ rlECKSTR0!1) just

and I says,

'no, I didn't.

I
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haven't got any money to pay taxes with now on that group
(sic) on the desert"'.

(Tr. P22, LL16-18)

Again, MARION agreed under cross examination by
Defendant-Appellant's counsel '"hen he "'as asked •••• "at that
time you told him (VERE BECKSTROM) that the property "'as
worthless and you couldn't make it and you weren't going
to farm i t anymore and you didn't want anything to do with
it,

didn't you?"

(Tr. P29, LLll-15).

MARION agreed that

(Tr. P29, LlS)

was true.

VERE BECKSTROM recalls llARION' s 'vords as, after

he had asked J>lARION if he wanted to pay taxes on the property
"to hell with it---let the state take it and pay it off".
(Tr. P48, LL7-9 c'nd P64, LL2-3)
It is clear that the thrust of 111\RION's statement
and his intent in 1959 when asked to pay taxes on the Hunt
Property was c>ssentially the same as AK'JllUR TIJON's staLcment
in Lhe Thom vs. Tlwm c;,:;e, ~u_pr-~. l·illen asked to pay off Lhe

:\RTllUR 'Ji!Ol'l .. ,.,de othte[ :;i,,lilRr J:cprcsenlations to

;\RlilUR l!JOH

took certain sll'pS Lo

t

.1lce over Lhe Linn :md

The Court: note' d:
"Plaintiff, on Lhe othl'r hand, by his
conduct as ':ell as l1y l1is \·,ords, <~ppruved
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and acquiesced in Clifford's assertions
of mvnership.
He claimed no title after
1932, nor any right to rent or the crops.
He did not concern himself about taxes intere~t or payment, on the mortgage, upkeep
and ~mprovements of the premises or any of
the things in which an mvner of the property
would be interested."
In the instant case, MARION BECKSTROM, after 1959,
did rot interest himself in the payment of the taxes, payment
for the drilling of the well, or any of the other matters
that are associated with ownership of property.

There is

some testimohy by him and his wife that he contacted VERE
BECKTROM at least on one occassion and suggested that there
Has

a buyer available for the property by the name of

CARDNER, but thAt is disputed by the Defendant and even, at
C~ccording

best,

to M/1.RION BECKSTROJ1's mm testimony, amounted

only to a statemc2nt that GARDNER was available or interested
in P""c"',asing the property.

That could be interpreted as a

lnolhcrly effort to Assist his brother, VERE, if he was looking
lur

a

ruccr.aser as casi ly as it could be interpreted as a

r, ,,, ·,.·c·d cL1 i m to 01mership in the property.
;,,,; J,ing

ro

;],c

He certainly did

,,J·e :,nd ,•vcn by his o1·m r·ustiTnony did not object

:;nid C\Rii'IER.

"'r"he clniPJ of estoppel rc•sts upon Plaintiff's
dic;C'l:lil,;r'l. of :1ll title and interest in the
fan~ :md his consent that Clifford might
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take over the farm under any arrangement
which he could make by which Clifford
and his wife were influenced to deal with
the property in the belief that they were
the owners thereof sofar as Plaintiff
was concerned, to continue in actual
possession of the farm, to acquire Frank
V. Thorn's title, and to expend large
sums of money for the payment of taxes,
principal, and interest on the mortgage,
repairs, improvements, and upkeep of
the premises so that under the circumstances
it would be unjust now to permit Plaintiff
to assert title."
Certainly, again, that statement pertains and re&
precisely to the

:instant case.

The Defendant, VERE BECKSTRr

and his wife, ELIZABETH, relied upon the representations mac
by MARION, treated the property as their own for several ye2
to '"hich they n:>ceived no objection from MARION, and then
ultimately

lvhen VERE had t:;rown old nnd lvas unable to oper;;c

or lease the property himself, contracted to sell the prope
Unfortunately for them,
not the farm

it.'"~lf,

therc~1fter,

the vnlue of the l·later,

but the \l<cter, bec:l;;·,e considerably

rlOc.

intC'rC'st in the property.

invested his ,,,,mey in :11:ell :•nd all ihc •JllHcr

~Ji

th

a

li abi lily

COllll' j_

V:Jh ly

dS

])

i ,•;h

'lo;

c>-lwl<:il'S

$ ·35, l)lJ0, 00 if the
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:mJ

Cross Complainant is successful in his appeal.
The Thorn case, again on page 464 meets that very
situation with these words:
"TI1e vital principal is that he who by
his language or conduct leads another to do
what he would not otherwise have done,
shall not subject such___r_erson to loss or
injury by_~appoint~ the expectations
~~n which he acted.
Such a change of
position is sternfY forbidden.
It involves
fraud and falsehood, and the law abhors
both.
This remedy is alwa;rs to be applied
as_!Q___promote the ends of JUStice."
(Emphasis Added)
Another very important point made by the Thorn case
and which is an almost identical situation to the present
case,

is found in these words:
"If Plaintiff had done nothing at all
with respect to the mortgage, which his
words and conduct showed was his intention,
he vJOuld have lost the land anyway.
Instead
of letting the land go by foreclosure, he
consC'nted to the taking over by Clifford,
"'110, relying on his \·JOrds and conduct
\·.Thi ch continuC'd throughout the pt'ri od
l>om 1932 to the coimnencclllent of this
"cti_on, acted thereon and changed his
position to his prejudice."
Tn dw present ca,;e, had the Defcmdant-Appr>llant

,''Cili'J·iy, ll.\inUN \·!Ould have lost his inLerest by virtue of the
cill·1Ly L"king t·he lno 1,l-'rly for that failure to pay the taxes •
. ;;:•in,

this is ;,n id,·nt·i.cal situ:11 ion to th:1t in the Thorn

Tlw Court Lhcre fuund lhat undC'r those circu!'lstances,
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the

Plaintiff, ARTHUR THOM, was estopped to assert title,
If justice be done, the Court here can do no less

than reach the same conclusion.
II.
That the Plaintiff-Respondant should be estopp
from asserting an objection to the sale by Defendant-Appel!
of the property referred to herein as the "Hunt Property" to
the Cross Plaintiff-Appellant.
Without belaboring the facts or the situation as
described in the brief heretofore, and if the Court were not
to accept the position that MARION BECKSTROM is estopped froclaiming any title to the property, the interest of justice
would certainly dictate that he is, at the very least, estop,
from objecting to the sale of the property '"hich was made by
VERE BECKS'fROH to the Cross Complainant-Appellant, NORHAND

D.

LAUB.
!11\RION BECKSTROl1, in his testimony and in the test
of his wife FAYE BECKSTROH, represented that on at least t\·cO
occassions he proposed to VERE BECKSTROH that the property .
sold.

The first '"as in 1959 right flfter he had abandoncod

property.

t'

Thcore is dispute that he proposed se11ing t:hco Hun·

Property but that, in fact, he only proposed sel1 ing tlw Jp.
Property, but be thilt as it mRy, even if 111\RION BECKSTROH's
version of the circu~stances were to be accepted, he WRS, ~
fact suggesting, requesting and ngrceing to tllc sale of the
Hunt Property at that time.
A8ain, in 1970, accucJing to the LcstiJ1C'l1Y of !lAF'
BECKSTROH's wife, FAYE BECKSTROM, she conveyed

11

su/~L,cstion
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to the Defendant-Appellant, VERE BECKSTROM, that the property
be sold to a "MR. GARDNER".
In view of the two representations referred to above,
if they were, in fact, made, that the property be sold, certainly
VERE BECKSTROM was entitled to believe that his brother,
MARION, if he did, in fact, have a viable claim to the property,
l·oanted to sell the property.
of

In fact, under 11ARION's version

the circumstances, it was only VERE that did not wish

to sell it.

Therefore, if VERE later changed his mind and

found a buyer, he is certainly justified in assuming that he
was acting with the approval and the consent of his brother,
MARION.
There is not question that in 1972, when the property
Has

sold to LAUB, that it vJas sold at a reasonable value.

'TI1e only testimony in the record is that of an independant
~rpraiser

and expert witness who testified that the value of the

p1:operty was

$~0,

000,00, the amount for ''hich it \vas sold by

'IU<.E !1ECKSTHOM to NORl"'AND D, LAUB.

Consequently, the Defendant-Appellant, would respectfully
.,,,]J,,it that if

tlw Court is not persuaded that the Plaintiff-

;:;,,.,pnndnnt, 1!/\RION

Bb~CKSTROM

is estopped from claiming any

i 11 iJ·

1:1.:'St 11hatcver i.n the property, he is at least estopped from

Jl!Y.V

a•;;.;crling an object ion to the sale of the property and

·hould he 0ntitlcd only to one-half of the proceeds of that
;nle less perhnps, zm adjustment for the relative investments

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25-

made in the property by the Plaintiff-Respondant and the
Defendant-Appellant.

III.
That the Court below erred in sustaining objec:
to eJidence tending to show that Plaintiff-Respondant abandc-·
the subject property and his claim of an interest in it and
that he should be estopped from asserting such a claim,
The Defendant-Appellant, VERE BECKSTROM, upon
substituting counsel in the case, filed a lfotion to Amend hL
Ans,.;er
the

to allege,

~firmative

pursuant to the statutes of the State of

r·

defense of estoppel.

The Plaintiff had filed a Motion for Partial Surrino:
Judr;ment and Defendant-Appellant filed a Memorandum in Oppos:
to that Hotion for Partial S1..n11mary Judgment, discussing, in
detail, t11e principal of C>quitable estoppel or 0stoppel in F
as it pcrlains to the instant case,
Thonsh the Hotion Lo Anwnd Ans1·1ex by the DefendancAppellant -.-;os filed on the 2nd day of !·larch, 1977, it \·!as cc
heard by Lhe Court 1111 ti 1 the day ,; (' t

for i_ria 1, to-wit lr3rch

15, 19/7.
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even having heard any evidence whatever on the issue.
Furthermore, during the trial, it later became apparent that
the Court had neither read nor considered the DefendantAppellant's Me~orandum pertaining to the principal of equitable
estoppel or estoppel in pais when the Court said, upon a reference
being made to the Memorandum by counsel,
any Memorandum.
the

"Well, I don't see

There is nothing before me on that.

trial right now."

(Tr. P74, 111-3)

I am at

After a short colloquy

between the Court and counsel for Defendant-Appellant, the Court
stated again, obviously without having read or considered the
Defendant-Appellant's brief on the

~atter,

"Hell, I don't agree,

Com1sel, but go ahead and ask your question.
quicker to do that than to argue it."

It might be

(Tr. P74, 1128-30)

Immediately thereafter, when the Defendant-Appellant

atte~pted

to pursue the issue, the Court sustained an objection to any
reference to

the Lewis Property sunmarily cutting off any

fnrther evidence which counsel for the Defendant-Appellant
:rC'prC'sen ted ,,muld delllOnstrate MARION's attitudes towards the
J:qqt P t'operly :'nd tend to sho'v , _ -hether or not an l3stoppel in
p:1i .s h:1d,

in fact, occuru•d LC8arLling the Hunt Property.
Thcre3fter, upon the conclusion of the evidence,

"''HI t1pnn time for ~~rgur,-,ent,

though it is not recorded, the

Cutn·t r·ef1lsc>d 1·o pennit counc;el for Defendant-Appellant,
VEPE BFCKSTROM,

to even argue or discuss the theory of equitable

est<;ppel.
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The. Court then, upon motion of Plaintiff-Respondant'
counsel to strike the defense of equitable estoppel, immediate
granted it without any argument whatever being permitted,
(Tr. Pl02, LL12-16)
It is respectfully submitted that the Court below
was disinclined from the very commencement of the trial to e'.'
consider the merits of a defense based upon the theory of an
equitable estoppel.

Yet, in failing to consider the said

~~

in failing to admit evidence to support said defense and in
striking said defense and thereafter finding that the Plaintif
Respondant, MARION BECKSTROM, did in fact have a one-half
interest in the subject property, and finding that the Defend:
Appellant, is liable to the Cross Complainant-Appellant, for
damaEes,

the Court is subjecting the Defendant-Appellant to

An inequitnble, and unjust penalty for his having had the
foresight and the \vi.lling1:1ess to expend funds,
of his

lime and eHoc

o1vn to tl1c prescrvaUon of the subject property from

an ultimate tax sAle.
S]H)Ulcl

in his appeAl,
not

b'

J·he Cross C< ·1plainant-.\ppelLont be

SllCCcssfr

thot P'-''ltll.ty upon l"he De[cnd:mt-flppe] J :111t coli 1

Ji,'J·ely a loss of tl1e bill :1nce of the pi1Y"~' nts suppo,;cri

dne Def,·rl<hnt-.\ppc•l] .;t!t under the conl r:l<:t

11i

th Cr·o:os Col<~pl.c"

Appellant as the Court belmv nJlC'd, hut cvcn ns ,nuch

:1s

an

Affirmative n\,,ard of up to $;>5,000.00 oc $35,000,00 clepcncl
upon this Court's ultimate disposition nf Ccoss CN,1pli1inant-
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1

Appellant's appeal.

Certainly, the only person who put any

money into the property in the first instance, i.e. the
Defendant-Appellant, should not be required to enrich another,
1vhen all he did \vas rely upon statements and representations
made by MARION, the Plaintiff-Respondant herein,
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Court below
erred i_n striking the defense of equitable estoppel, which
lhe

Di~fcnd:cmt-Appel]ant

attempted to interpose, and further

erred in not applying the principal of equitable estoppel in
in not finding that the acts and conduct

lhe insttmt case and

of the Pbintiff-Rcspondant, liARJ:ON BECKSTROM, did in fact
''~'''"U

tule a bnsis upon \•7hi.ch tbe Dt?fenclant-AppelLmt was

entitled to rely and that the Plaintiff-Rcspondant should be
:hcrefore estopped from asserting his claim to the property.
Gn the ol her hand, should che Court not find that
11-,, LvJ"''''" •_.,.,-,s

'l.;~

crl

"'''

''"

·•n

, ,,,] y

·;ni-riciLnt to ''''~inlain Lhat principal,

uLjl'L'

,,

1

i

()11

l_u

i.1H2 sale by i_h2

though

D~fcnde!nt-Appc::ll:H1t

·ely \olhi ch uilght: Lo be :J\·,'a,~ded l~o I he Plaintiff

, , 1,,,-il,,;;,,n the J'l:lintiff-•'l.esponrhnt llr:lde lo the purchase
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The Defendant-Appellant respectfully submits that
the

Court should reverse the decision of the Court below

and hold that the Plaintiff has no interest in the subject
property; or in the alternative that the Plaintiff-Respondanc
be estopped from objecting to the sale of the property and
be awarded only one-half of the purchflse price subject to an
accounting of offsets as appropriate and equitable, or, in
the alternative,

that the matter be remitted to the Court

below for a new trial.
DATED this

~

v::--_)___

day o~ ~ust, 1977.

Ji~tl;_A;h
J. l·lacArthur 1-Jright,
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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